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Introduction 
Cross border marriage means marrying outside ones ethnicity and culture. It means two people 
with different background, different identity and probably different beliefs coming together as 
husband and wife. The paper will focus on the case of conversion of one party to a non-Muslim 
marriage to Islam. At present, in Malaysia, the legal issues around conversion to Islam have 
become the topic of concern. Issues such as who shall have the right to petition for divorce, the 
right of the wife to receive maintenance for herself from the convert husband, the wife„s equal 
right as a parent to decide on matters relating to her child‟s upbringing, the right of the wife to 
inherit from the estates of her deceased convert husband and others. Recently, the Malaysian 
Federal Court in the case of Subashini has made its decision concerning the conversion; 
however, the decision in this case has been described as still unclear and confusing especially on 
the issue of jurisdiction of the court. Thus, the discussion in this paper focuses on the right of the 
wife upon the conversion of her husband to Islam i.e., her right to maintenance, division of 
matrimonial property and custody of children under the existing family law. In discussing those 
issues reference will be made to the provisions under the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) 
Act, 1976 (LRA), the Islamic Family Law Act/Enactment and other relevant statutes. Cases 
decided in the Civil and Shariah Courts will be discussed. The paper will also make some 
suggestions to the existing problem surround the conversion to Islam issues.  
 
Right to Apply for Divorce 
Presently, under the law the right is only given to the non-convert party to apply for divorce. 
Section 51 (1) of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act, 1976 clearly states that where 
one party to a marriage has converted to Islam, the other party who has not so converted may 
petition for divorce.
1
 However, the petition can only be presented before the expiration of the 
period of three months from the date of the conversion.
2
 
 
In Subashini A/P Rajasingam v Saravanan A/L Thangathoray,3  Nik Hashim J states: 
“The wife‟s petition was filed in contravention of the requirement under proviso 
to section 51 (1) of the 1976 Act in that it was filed two months and 18 days short 
of three months after the husband‟s conversion to Islam.”  
 
It is submitted from the above provision that if the non-Muslim party refuses to petition for 
divorce under section 51 (1) of the Act, the couple are still husband and wife and are still bound 
by their former law. It is understood that the conversion does not determine or automatically 
                                                          
1
 The above section was referred by Lee Hun Hoe C.J in the case of Sivanesan v Shymala [1986] 1 MLJ 400. 
2
 Recently in the case of Subashini A/P Rajasingam v Saravanan A/L Thangathoray [2007] 2 MLJ 798 the Federal 
Court judge explained that the proviso imposes a caveat on the wife not to file the petition for divorce until a lapse 
of 3 months from the date of the husband‟s conversion to Islam. 
3
 [2007] 2 MLJ 798 
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dissolve the marriage. This is different from the Shariah where conversion of non-Muslim party 
to Islam will automatically terminate the marriage. 
 
The effect of section 51 (1) of the LRA is explained further in the case of Easwari Visuvalingam 
v. Government of Malaysia.
4
 In this case, the appellant married Visuvalingam Ponniah according 
to Hindu rites and the said marriage was registered on 15
th 
November, 1950. Visuvalingam 
Ponniah embraced Islam on 16
th
 July, 1978 and adopted the name of Abdul Hamid Abdullah.  
Visuvalingam was a pensioner under the Pensions Act, 1980. He died on 7
th
 January, 1985. By a 
letter of 7
th
 March, 1985, the plaintiff applied to the Public Services Department for derivative 
pension. On 16
th
 April, 1986, the Pensions Department rejected the plaintiff‟s application on the 
same grounds as stated in the statement of defence by the husband.  
 
The issue before the High Court was, as stated in the summons-in-chambers dated 8
th
 June, 1987, 
for the court to deal with the question under Order 33 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 
„whether the non-conversion of the plaintiff from her religion to that of Islam within three 
months of the conversion to Islam of her spouse dissolves the marriage between the plaintiff and 
her husband and thereafter disentitles her from being a „dependant‟ within the definition 
contained in section 4 of the Pensions Adjustment (Amendment) Act 1983 and to a pension 
under section 15 of the Pensions Act 1980‟.5 Section 15 (1) (a) of the Pensions Act, 1980 
provides for derivative pension to persons prescribed in the Regulations.  
 
Hashim Yeop Sani while delivering his decision in the Supreme Court observed;  
“There is no evidence that the marriage has been dissolved. The appellant is suing 
as a widow as defined under the pension laws. The fact that the husband has 
converted to Islam does not in our view effect the appellant's rights under the 
Pensions Act, 1980 and the 1980 (Pensions) Regulations. 
 
Similarly, Wan Adnan J. in the case of Pedley v Majlis Agama Islam P. P
6
 states; 
“It is therefore clear that under the law a non Muslim marriage is not dissolved 
upon one of the parties converting to Islam. It only provides a ground for the other 
party who has not so converted to petition for divorce”. 
 
                                                          
4
 [1990] 1 MLJ 86 
5
 The word „dependant‟ is defined in s 4 of the Pensions Adjustment Act 1980 as „a widow, widower, child, mother 
or father of a deceased officer.‟ The word „widow‟ is defined in the Pensions Regulations, 1980 as „the surviving 
spouse of a deceased officer whose marriage is recognized in Malaysia as a valid marriage under any written law, 
religion, custom or usage.‟ 
6
 [1990] 2 MLJ 307 
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In another case of conversion to Islam, the High Court in Ng Siew Pian v. Abdul Wahid bin Abu 
Hassan, Kadi Daerah Bukit Mertajam & Anor had arrived at a similar opinion.
7
 It was held in 
this case that the Kadhi has no right to annul the marriage as it was contrary to the law and thus it 
has no legal effect. The court further said that conversion will not automatically determine the 
marriage but only provides a ground for divorce under section 51(1) of the LRA, 1976. 
 
Recently, in the case of Subashini A/P Rajasingam v Saravanan A/L Thangathoray
8
 the Federal 
Court observed that the dissolution order of the civil marriage by the Syariah High Court by 
virtue of conversion would have no legal effect in the High Court other than as evidence of the 
fact of the dissolution of the marriage under the Islamic law in accordance with Hukum Syarak. 
Thus, the non-Muslim marriage between the husband and wife remains intact and continues to 
subsist until the Civil High Court dissolves it pursuant to a petition for divorce by the non-
Muslims spouse. 
 
Another relevant section to be discussed is section 3(3) of the LRA which states that the Act 
shall not apply to a Muslim or to any person who is married under Muslim law. In Letchumy v. 
Ramadeson,
9
 Vohrah J is of the view that section 3(3) of the LRA precludes the operation of the 
provision of section 77 of the same Act to the Muslims. However, in Tey Siew Choo v Teo Eng 
Hua
10
 the court pointed out that section 3(3) of the LRA was applicable to the convert spouse as 
the parties were married under the LRA. The decision in Tey Siew Choo’s case was followed in 
the case of Johan Fairbairn Abdullah
11
 where the court held that the convert spouse is still 
subjected to the LRA.   
 
In the recent case of Yong Fuat Meng v Chin Yoon Kew
12
 the court held that since the petitioner 
in this case was not a born Muslim there was no prohibition for the petitioner to appear before 
the civil court to settle his obligations or liabilities that he himself had previously subscribed to 
by contracting a civil marriage under the LRA.  
 
There is a question as to whether the right is given to the Muslim party to petition for divorce 
under the LRA. In the case of Tey Siew Choo @ Nur Aishah Tey Binti Abdullah v Teo Eng Hua
13
 
among the issues deliberated are; 
1) Whether the petitioner‟s conversion to Islam automatically ended their marriage. 
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2) Whether the petitioner could petition for divorce under the Act, in view of the fact that 
she had converted to Islam and the Act specifically exclude the Muslim. 
3) Whether it is just and reasonable to allow the petition and dissolve the marriage.  
 
It was held that a conversion of one party will not automatically dissolve the marriage under the 
Civil Law. Since, the marriage was a non-Muslim marriage; it did not automatically end when 
the petitioner embraced Islam, but need to be dissolved by the court. The judge further said that 
parliament could not have intended that a party to a non-Muslim marriage who had converted to 
Islam be denied of the same right enjoyed by the other party. Therefore, there was absolutely no 
legal impediment for her to make petition in this case. The petitioner status as a Muslim at the 
time of the presentation of the petition was irrelevant. 
 
Based on the above case, it is submitted that the converted spouse may petition for divorce under 
the LRA. The Muslim spouse may petition for a divorce on the ground that the marriage has 
irretrievably broken down as stated under sections 53 and 54 of the LRA. Thus, if the convert 
spouse is the wife, she may petition for divorce under the above two sections of the LRA. 
 
As suggested by Prof. Ahmad Ibrahim, it is submitted that to be fair to the converting as well as 
the non-converting parties, both should be given the same right to petition for divorce on the 
grounds of conversion to Islam.
14
 Prof. Ahmad emphasised that the best solution in order to 
secure justice for both parties, the conversion section of the LRA should be amended to read as; 
„Where one party to a marriage has converted to Islam, either party to the 
marriage may petition for divorce”15    
 
At the same time, according to Prof. Ahmad necessary amendment should also be made to the 
application section of the LRA i.e., section 3(3).  
 
Rights after Divorce on Conversion of the husband to Islam  
Section 51(2) of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act, 1976 provides that the court upon 
dissolving the marriage may make provision for the wife or husband, and for the support, care 
and custody of the children of the marriage, if any, and may, attach any conditions to the decree 
of the dissolution as it thinks fit. Based on the above provision, there are certain rights that can 
be claimed by the wife namely, the right to the matrimonial property, maintenance of wife and 
the custody of children. These rights of the wife will be discussed below. 
                                                          
14
 Ahmad Ibrahim, „The need to amend section 51 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976‟ [1990] 1 
MLJ, Iviii.  
15
 Ibid. 
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Right to Matrimonial Property (harta sepencarian) 
The right to the matrimonial property is provided for under section 76 of the LRA which gives 
the civil court the power to order the division of the matrimonial assets. At the same time the 
provision under the Islamic Family Law Act/Enactment also give the power to the Shariah Court 
to order division of harta sepencarian i.e., matrimonial assets. The concept of harta sepencarian 
under the Islamic Family Law is similar to that of the matrimonial assets under the LRA though 
they differ in some practical details.
16
 
 
The principle of division of matrimonial property was applied in the case of Koh Yian Geok v 
Zulkifli Tan Abdullah.
17
 It was held that the marriage was dissolved upon the conversion of the 
respondent to Islam. As for the claim of ancillary reliefs, the court after deliberating the laws of 
division of matrimonial property under section 76 of the LRA, and the evidence adduced decided 
that the petitioner was entitled to the beneficial owner of the matrimonial property and the 
respondent was to deliver vacant possession of the same and the respondent was to return the set 
of jewellery to the petitioner and its equivalent value of the time of purchase.  
 
It is submitted that in the case of conversion of one party to Islam there is no conflict between 
the LRA and Shariah in the division of matrimonial property as the provisions of both law are 
the same except in matters concerning the Employee Provident Fund (EPF) and insurance. This 
is because the Shariah Courts in Malaysia do not recognize assets in EPF and insurance as 
matrimonial property while the civil courts recognize them as matrimonial property.
18
  
 
Right to Maintenance  
Section 77 of the LRA provides that a court may order a man to pay maintenance to his wife or 
former wife. The same section also provides that the court can order a woman to pay 
maintenance to her husband or former husband if he is partially or wholly incapacitated from 
earning a livelihood.
19
 
 
The above provisions show that it is an obligation of a husband to give maintenance to his wife 
during the subsistence of the marriage and this obligation continues after the dissolution of the 
marriage. For his former wife, the husband under the LRA is responsible over her maintenance 
                                                          
16
 Najibah Mohd Zin, „Resolving the conflicts in family disputes involving conversion of a spouse to Islam under the 
Malaysian law‟  [2007] LR 65 
17
 [1995] 2 AMR 1525 
18
Now the Shariah courts in some States in Malaysia recognize that EPF as harta sepencarian, see Najibah Mohd 
Zin, „Resolving the conflicts in family disputes involving conversion of a spouse to Islam under the Malaysian 
law,‟ [2007] LR 65 
19
 Section 77 (2) of the LRA 
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until the remarriage of the wife or if she is living in adultery.
20
 These provisions are contrary to 
the principles of maintenance under the Shariah. In Islam, the obligation of a Muslim husband to 
pay maintenance to his former wife will end upon the expiry of the period of „iddah which is 
generally about three months. In Islam too, a Muslim wife is not obliged to give maintenance to 
her husband under whatsoever situation including if the husband is incapacitated either 
physically or mentally.  
 
The question arises as to how to resolve the above conflict of law on the principle of 
maintenance between the Shariah and the LRA. It is not easy to resolve this conflict as it 
involves two different principles of law. The practice in the Malaysian courts so far seem to 
decide in favour of the non-convert wife by recognizing her rights to claim for her ancillary 
reliefs after the conversion of her husband to Islam.   
 
However, in the earlier case of Letchumy v. Ramadeson
21
 Vohrah J. states; 
“Section 3(3) precludes the operation of the provision of section 77 to the Muslim 
and as the respondent (husband) is now a Muslim, I do not think that they can be 
made applicable to him. It would have been different if the divorce had in fact 
been granted under section 51 where in that case, the court would have been 
enabled by the specific provision of section 51(2) to make provision to the 
petitioner‟s maintenance”. 
 
In the above case, since the respondent was then a Muslim, the claim for ancillary relief could 
not be granted to the petitioner. The court further held that the claim can only be made on the 
ground of conversion to Islam. 
 
Not long after the decision in Letchumy‟s case, another case with the same issue was brought to 
the civil court for its deliberation and the decision in the case of Letchumy had been commented 
and criticized.
22
 The Supreme Court in Tan Sung Mooi v. Too Miew Kim
23
 held that “By looking 
to the intention of the Parliament while enacting section 51(2) i.e., to give protection to the non-
Muslim spouse and children against the Muslim convert, the court therefore, has a jurisdiction to 
hear and determine the ancillary status despite the fact that the divorce was not granted under 
section 51.” 
 
                                                          
20
 Section 82 of the LRA, 1976 
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 [1984] 1 MLJ 143 
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 Tan Sung Mooi V. Too Miew Kim [1994] 3 MLJ 117 
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Nuraisyah observes that the judge in the above case construed the application of the LRA 
differently and held that the LRA only applies to non-Muslims and non-Muslim marriages. She 
further remarks that the word „Muslim‟ in section 3(3) of the LRA was construed as a Muslim at 
the time of the marriage and not at time of the petition of the case. Thus, the judge in the above 
case held that since the convert spouse was not a Muslim at the time of the marriage, he shall be 
governed under the LRA.
24
  
 
The above case shows that the Malaysian Civil High Courts have jurisdiction to hear and 
determine the ancillary issues including maintenance of the wife. The LRA i.e., section 51 is 
clearly intended to provide ancillary reliefs to the non-Muslim spouse to avoid injustice being 
caused to the wife especially. Dato‟ Faiza Thamby Chik has made the statement that “conversion 
to Islam cannot be used as a ground for avoiding (a Muslim convert‟s) legal obligation under the 
non-Muslim marriage.”25 
 
However, it is to note that the legislature as well as the judiciary in their eagerness to ensure 
justice for the non-Muslim wife must also equally ensure that the right of the convert wife is 
protected.  Thus, under the LRA she is entitled to her maintenance after the expiry of the period 
of ‘iddah from her non-Muslim husband until her right to maintenance ceases. However, under 
section 77(2) the convert wife can be ordered by the court to pay maintenance to her non-convert 
husband if he is partially or wholly incapacitated from earning a livelihood. As stressed above, 
this is contrary to the Islamic law principle where a Muslim wife is not obliged to pay 
maintenance to her former husband. It is felt that this provision is unfair to the wife as she is 
being a woman to be responsible over her husband maintenance. It cannot be imagined that the 
wife would convert to Islam in order to evade her responsibilities and duties specified under the 
LRA as normally alleged in the case of the convert husband. However, there is no reported case 
to see the application of the above provision.    
 
Right to Child’s Custody 
Both under the LRA and the Shariah that the custody of the child should be decided based on the 
interest or welfare of the child. The welfare of the child is paramount in determining the 
custodial rights after divorce including if the marriage is dissolved because of the conversion.
26
 
Both laws also recognize that the custody of the younger child should be given to the mother. 
This is because of the fact that the mother is more affectionate and loving to children. 
Furthermore, she is more experience and knowledgeable in handling a small infant especially in 
the case where she breastfeeds the infant. Section 88 of the LRA states that “there shall be a 
                                                          
24
 Nuraisyah Chua Abdullah, Conversion to Islam-Effect on status of marriages and ancillary reliefs, ILBS, 2004, 
pp. 22-23. 
25
 Faiza Thamby Chik, “Legal Effect of Conversion to Islam: An Experience from the Malaysian Court,” A Keynote 
Address, International Family Law Conference 2007 (16-17January 2007), organized by the IIUM and Department 
of Syariah Judiciary Malaysia, p. 5. 
26
 Section 88 of the LRA and section 87 of the Islamic Family Law Act. 
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rebuttable presumption that it is for the good of a child below the age of seven years to be with 
his or her mother...”  
 
In the case of Yip Fook Tai v. Manjit Singh S/O Mohar Singh @ Mohammad Iskandar Manjit 
Bin Abdullah
27
 it was held that order of custody can be made by the court. However, in deciding 
the custody of the children, whether it should be given to the converted or non converted parties, 
the paramount consideration is still on the welfare of the child. Thus, the elder daughter in this 
case remained with the converted husband while the custody the younger one was given to the 
mother. 
 
Based on the welfare principle, the court in Nur Aishah Suk Bte Abdullah @ Sukwinder Kaur A/P 
Sajhan Singh v. Harjeet Singh
28
 after taking into account the report of the welfare officer 
concerning the background of both parties and the child welfare, decided that the custody of the 
child should be given to the applicant i.e., the converted mother. In the case of Genga Devi 
Chelliah v. Santanam Damodaram
29
 the husband converted to Islam. The wife was dissatisfied 
with the decision made by the Syariah Court Alor Setar, Kedah to give the custody of their only 
child to the husband. The wife then tried to get a declaration that the order made by the Syariah 
court to be set aside. The court in this case held that; 
“By virtue of Article 121(1A) of the Federal Constitution, the Civil Court has no 
jurisdiction and the matters falls under the jurisdiction of the Syariah Court. Thus, 
the father who is a Muslim has a full right to decide the religion of the child and 
the custody was given to him.”  
 
It is observed that the courts in Malaysia in deciding on the custody of the child decide based on 
the interest of the child and at the same time other factors, such as education, religion, culture, 
financial stability, health, care and support, attitude of the parent and others are taken into 
consideration. In the case of Shamala Sathiyaseelan v Dr Jeyaganesh C. Mogarajah
30
 the court 
awarded custody to the mother with access to the father. The court held that the right of religious 
practice of the two infant children shall be exercised equally by both parents as laid out in the 
Guardianship of Infants Act, 1961. 
 
Suggestion and recommendation 
Section 51 of the LRA only allows the non-converting part to petition for divorce. It is submitted 
that as suggested by many both parties the converting and the non-converting must be given the 
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 [1990] 2 CLJ 605 
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 [2000] 7 MLJ 547 
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 [2001] 2 CLJ 359 
30
 [2007] 2 MLJ 798 
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same right to petition for divorce on the grounds of conversion to Islam. Thus, section 51 of the 
LRA need to be amended to allow the converted party to petition for divorce. 
 
There is suggestion that the court that should have the power to dissolve the marriage in the case 
of conversion is the civil court. The reason is that since the marriage was contracted under the 
LRA only the civil court can hear and decide on the case. At present, as decided recently by the 
Federal Court in the case of Subashini, the States Shariah Courts do not have jurisdiction over 
non-Muslims. In matters within the States Syariah courts‟ jurisdiction, the Civil High Courts 
have no jurisdiction over the Muslims. Moreover, section 3(3) of the LRA clearly excludes its 
application to the Muslims. Under the current structure of the legal system in Malaysia and also 
because of the article 121 (1A) of the Federal Constitution perhaps, the setting up of a special 
tribunal to resolve matters that arise from conversion might be the best solution to the 
jurisdiction of court issue. This special tribunal must comprise of those experts and experienced 
judges from both Muslims and non-Muslims. This is considered as the best solution to avoid 
interference of jurisdiction between shariah and civil courts. In line with this, it is necessary to 
introduce new law, rules and regulation for the purpose of setting up of the proposed tribunal. 
This is important as when one spouse to a non-Muslim union converted to Islam all issues such 
as maintenance, custody, matrimonial property and inheritance must be settled or decided upon 
immediately. Any duties and liabilities of the convert husband that are still due on the wife 
should be settled before or at the time when the marriage is dissolved. 
 
It is submitted that on the right of the wife to the custody of the child, the existing provisions are 
adequate as it is based on the principle of the child‟s welfare which is recognized under both law, 
i.e., Muslims and non-Muslims. The court in deciding which parent that should be awarded with 
the custody order should consider all factors and decide based on which parent that will be able 
to provide better care and protection of the child. It is suggested that joint custody to both parents 
as practised in other jurisdictions should be practised by the Malaysian courts to encourage the 
parties to work together for the best upbringing of the child. 
 
It has been suggested that section 3(3) of the LRA specify that, consistent with section 51 of the 
LRA, the courts may make any order relating to pertinent matters, including the division of 
matrimonial property, maintenance for the wife, custody and maintenance for children and all 
ancillary claims after divorce.
31
 This is important to safeguard the right of non-convert spouse, 
usually the wife, when the husband converts to Islam. 
 
It is also suggested that the court can order the convert husband to pay maintenance to the non- 
Muslim wife not only during the period of ‘iddah but it can be extended even after the expiry of 
the period of ‘iddah.  This is not contrary to the principles of Shariah if the wife after divorce is 
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 Memorandum on safeguard rights of wives and children upon conversion of husbands to Islam submitted by the 
Joint Action Group for Gender Equality (JAG), 5 February 2007. 
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exposed to hardship and unable to maintain herself especially if she does not receive any support 
from her own family.
32
 The opinion of Hanafi scholars can be adopted who are in favour of 
giving out property in the form of financial support to the divorced wife to ensure her welfare is 
protected. Furthermore, unlike Muslim wife there is no such family support system that will be 
responsible to financially support the non-Muslim wife after divorce.
33
 The payment can be in 
the form of a one-off payment instead of monthly payment or it can be in the form of consolatory 
gift/payment.   
 
Conclusion 
To ensure the right of the wife is protected in the case of conversion, a review of the relevant 
laws relating to conversion to Islam is desired. More importantly, sections 3(3) and 51 of the 
LRA need to be amended to allow the convert spouse to petition for divorce and subsequently to 
allow the wife to apply for the ancillary claims after divorce. Accordingly, other relevant 
provisions need to be reviewed and amended. Without clear provisions on conversion, the right 
of the wife in family law, either as a non-Muslim or Muslim, will be not be safeguarded. To 
further ensure that due right is given to the wife, it is on the judiciary to evaluate the facts and 
decide according to the correct principles of both laws i.e., the LRA and Shariah law. It is felt 
that the best solution to the conversion issues is to settle the disputes/conflicts amicably between 
the parties involved. This matter can be resolved in amicable way through mediation, sulh, 
arbitration or special tribunal rather than through court.   
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 Najibah Mohd Zin, „Resolving the conflicts in family disputes involving conversion of a spouse to Islam under the 
Malaysian law‟ [2007] LR 65. 
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 See, Najibah Mohd Zin, „Resolving the conflicts in family disputes involving conversion of a spouse to Islam 
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